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Independence Day Special
2005
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Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2001
Christianity and Volition
Thomas M. Miovas, Jr.
><HB: (quoting Aristotle)
>"And further the possession of knowledge in another sense
>than those just named is something that happens to men;
>for within the case of having knowledge but not using it
>we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility
>of having knowledge in a sense and yet not having it, as
>in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk....It is
>plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be
>in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk.>
In the previous passage, Aristotle seems to be getting close to
understanding volition, at least implicitly, as Harry indicated (having
knowledge and exercising it or not exercising it); but notice in the
passage above that Aristotle seems to think it is *inconceivable* that a
man can freely act against his own knowledge -- saying, in effect, that
this can happen only if a man is "asleep, mad, or drunk." Clearly Aristotle
does not understand that one's volition can override one's knowledge --
i.e. that volition is more fundamental to human consciousness than
knowledge. Both the Ancient Greeks and the Ancient Romans (prior to the
widespread acceptance of Christianity) thought that if a man had knowledge
of right and wrong, he would *have* to follow that knowledge -- unless he
was asleep, mad, or drunk -- almost as a form of determinism.
<HB: No, I think this is a misreading of the passage. He is observing, by
reference to extreme cases, that people can "know" better than what they
do--by not exercising their knowledge.<snip>>
I have to give credit to the acceptance of volition as a fundamental aspect
of human consciousness to Augustine, especially in his book _The City of
God_, which was written well before the Dark Ages set in. One can certainly
say that Augustine and Plotinus via Plato brought about the Dark Ages, but
a crucially important understanding of the nature of human consciousness
was made prior to that time period. Ironically, this insight was brought
about due to a fundamental contradiction between early Christianity (which
Augustine was converted to from a form of materialism) and the nature of
reality -- or the relationship between morality and reality and the fact
that Christian morality is not based on reality.
<HB: Augustine is contradictory. He is very deterministic in many of his
writings.>
Christianity is not a moral code that can be practiced consistently,
because it is incompatible with human nature and reality, but this is
precisely what gave rise to Augusine's moral qualms that he relates in _The
City of God_. He continually claims that he has knowledge of good and evil,
yet he can not seem to practice the good -- i.e. "God grant me chastity,
but not just yet!" Because he believes he understands what God wants him to
do and what kind of life he should lead and yet does not practice it, he
realizes there is something missing from the formulation of the idea of the
incontinent man that was handed down from the Greeks and the Romans. That
missing element is **willfully** accepting the edicts of God -- i.e.
volitionally accepting to act according to one's chosen moral code.
Now, because Christianity's moral base was mystical (not based on fact),
willfully accepting God's edicts meant acting against reality -- which is
what brought about the Dark Ages. Nonetheless, as far as I know, this
formulation of freely and willfully accepting and practicing a moral code
is the first time in history anyone brought the issue up explicitly.
[Tom Miovas: I think in this thread, someone made the off-hand comment that
since I was raised Catholic, I could be forgiven for having the view that
Augustine (or Christians) were the first ones to have an explicit view
of voliton. I insert this comment just in case anyone out there thinks
Objectivists don't have a sense of humor ;)]
<HB: Some other good quotes from Aristotle:
"A man is said to have or not to have self-control according as his reason
has or has not the control, on the assumption that this <i.e., reason> is
the man himself; and the things men have done on a rational principle are
thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts." Bk IX, Ch. 8.
"The origin of action--its efficient, not its final cause--is choice, and
that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why
choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral
state..." Bk VI, Ch. 2
"... man is a moving principle or begetter of his actions as of children."
BK III, Ch. 5.>
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