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Independence Day Special
2005
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Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999
Concept Formation Versus Induction
Thomas M. Miovas, Jr.
For the last week or so I've been listening to Dr. Peikoff's
course "Objectivism through Induction," and I'm up to part five
(about half way through). So far, I think it's an excellent
course, primarily in the presentation of the inductive method of
validating philosophic principles, and I don't disagree with
anything he's saying -- with one exception. Perhaps it's more of
a confusion rather than a disagreement, but near the end of part
five someone asks a question about the relationship between
concept formation and induction. Basically, the question is:
Does concept formation involve induction? Dr. Peikoff answers
"no" to this question.
Before hearing Dr. Peikoff's answer, I would have said, "yes,"
concept formation is induction, because it moves one from the
perceptual to the conceptual, or it moves one from the concrete
to the abstract, which is what I thought induction was all about.
However, Dr. Peikoff states that induction involves
propositions; that single concepts are a creation of a file
folder containing items mentally separated out from other items,
but this doesn't involve induction because no propositions are
being used in the formation of a concept. While I agree that no
propositions are being used in the formation of a concept (at
least the first level concepts), I think something like a
proposition is being used implicitly.
A proposition, in his
example, is a statement that adds further knowledge to the
concept, such as "All men are mortal." When we originally form
the concept "man," we don't know that they are mortal, we just
know they have certain similarities.
"Man" is a concept formed when one grasps the similarities
between various existents. On a primitive level, let's say the
grasped similarities are walks upright and makes noises with his
mouth. If that is what is grasped, wouldn't the definition of
"man" be something like "(all) things that stand upright and
makes noises with his mouth"? I put the "all" in parenthesis
because I think it is implicit. In essence, one is saying that
everything (all things) that walk upright and makes noises with
his mouth is a man.
Certainly, for a properly formed concept, the definition has to
apply to all of that class (in an open ended manner); so I'm not
sure what distinction Dr. Peikoff is trying to make. I guess the
real question is: Why is he saying one has to be able to form
propositions before one can make inductions?
Obviously, Dr. Peikoff is using the term "induction" to mean
something other than simply moving from the specific to the
abstract.
He did mention that induction involved observing some
of the group, discovering knowledge about those members of the
group, then applying that knowledge to all of the group. I
don't know if this helps, since one doesn't observe all men to
form the concept man. Doesn't one have to observe some of the
(to be) class, then apply that knowledge to all of that class to
form the concept in the first place?
He mentioned this was a topic of an advanced seminar he was
having at the time, so maybe someone who was involved in that
seminar can provide a more detailed explanation?
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